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CONSTITUTION AND CAUSAL ROLES
Lorenzo Casini† and Michael Baumgartner‡
Alexander Gebharter (2017b) has proposed to use Bayesian network (BN)
causal discovery methods to identify the constitutive dependencies underwrit-
ing mechanistic explanations. The account assumes that mechanistic consti-
tution behaves like deterministic direct causation, such that BN methods are
directly applicable to mixed variable sets featuring both causal and constitutive
dependencies. Gebharter claims that such mixed sets, under certain restrictions,
comply with the assumptions of the causal BN framework. The aim of this pa-
per is twofold. In the first half, we argue that Gebharter’s proposal incurs severe
problems, ultimately rooted in widespread non-compliance of mechanistic sys-
tems with BN assumptions. In the second half, we present an alternative way to
bring BN tools to bear on the discovery of mechanistic constitution. More pre-
cisely, we argue that all of a phenomenon’s parts, whose causal roles account
for why the phenomenon has its characteristic causal role, are constituents—
where the notion of causal role is probabilistically understood.
1 INTRODUCTION
The mechanistic account of scientific explanation (Machamer et al., 2000;
Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Glennan, 2002) holds that the explanandum, a
higher-level phenomenon, is explained by the lower-level mechanism responsi-
ble for it. In a popular characterization,
[a] mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its com-
ponent parts, component operations, and their organization. The orches-
trated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phe-
nomena. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, 423)
To give a simple but paradigmatic example, which shall serve as our guiding
example throughout the paper, the phenomenon of amplification in a two-stage
amplifier is caused by a signal (e.g., current, voltage, power) received from an
input source, and causes effects such as signal distortion in an output device
(e.g., a loudspeaker). The phenomenon is explained by the augmentation of the
signal by the amplifier’s two transistors arranged in series (see Wimsatt 2007,
ch. 12).
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More generally, a mechanism is embedded in a causal context, where causal
background conditions are operative relative to which certain parts of the sys-
tem are responsible for the phenomenon. The relevant kind of responsibility is
constitutive rather than causal. The system’s parts that mechanistically explain
the phenomenon are the “component” (cf. quote), or constituent, parts. While
causation has been at the centre of philosophical theorizing for centuries, the
notion of constitution, or constitutive relevance, has only recently begun to at-
tract philosophical attention. In particular, it is still unclear what discovery
method(s) could systematize the data-based inference to constitution.
Gebharter (2017b) has suggested drawing on the resources of the Bayesian
network (BN) framework, which is widely used to model and discover cau-
sation (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2000), to address the task of constitutive
discovery. He claims that, despite the differences between causation and con-
stitution, the BN axioms used to model causation also capture constitution,
and that constitution can be implicitly characterized as a form of deterministic
direct causation. He concludes that BN causal discovery algorithms—PC, in
particular—may concurrently be used for both causal and constitutive discov-
ery.
After a brief introduction to causal BNs (§2), the first part of this paper
(§3) takes issue with this latter conclusion. Variable sets processed by BN
procedures must satisfy specific assumptions. Violations of these assumptions
have been argued to be rare in variable sets exclusively featuring causal rela-
tions, which are assumed to be non-deterministic (or pseudoindeterministic) in
the BN framework. Therefore, BN assumptions may be justifiably assumed
for causal contexts. Constitutive relations, by contrast, generate determinis-
tic dependencies, in the presence of which violations of BN assumptions are
no longer rare but commonplace, which undermines their justifiable assuma-
bility. Moreover, we argue that no systematically reliable inferences can be
drawn outside the scope of validity of those assumptions. This latter point is
illustrated and substantiated by a series of inverse search trials involving data
simulations, which evaluate the performance of the PC algorithm when applied
to mechanistic systems.
The second part of the paper (§4) proposes a sufficient condition for consti-
tution that avoids these problems and allows for bringing BN methods to bear
on the task of constitutive discovery in a theoretically sound way. In a nutshell,
our proposal is that all of a phenomenon’s parts, whose causal roles account for
why the phenomenon has its characteristic causal role, are constituents. This
idea has been recently expressed, in one way or another, by a number of authors
(e.g., Gillett 2002, 3191; see also Fazekas and Kerte´sz 2011 and Soom 20122)
1Gillett (2002) proposes an account of “realization” as a relation between the causal powers
individuating a phenomenon and those individuating its constituents.
2Contrary to Gillett (2002), Fazekas and Kerte´sz (2011) and Soom (2012) maintain that the
causal role of the phenomenon is identical to the causal role of its constituents. We do not
endorse this assumption.
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but it has never been cashed out in detail and with formal precision. We fill this
gap by giving it a precise rendering in the BN framework, which is particularly
suitable to explicate the notion of causal roles figuring in our account. We also
demonstrate the performance of the proposal by means of a series of inverse
search trials.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We begin by introducing the theory of causal BNs, as well as a notational con-
vention on the variables of BNs representing mechanistic systems.
Traditionally, the BN formalism uses generic random variables to represent
types (or degrees) of properties or behaviours independently of the entities in-
stantiating them. Here, however, we shall follow the mechanistic literature in
taking the variables as denoting the behaviours exhibited by specific entities
(such as a system and its constituents), and consequently adopt the following
notational convention. Calligraphic fonts are used for specific random vari-
ables A(S) and B(P1) (Spohn, 2006), by which we denote the behaviour A
of a specific system S and the behaviour B of a specific part P1. As we are
only concerned with specific variables, we will leave the entity-relativity of our
variables implicit and just write “A”, “B”, etc. for the behaviour types “A(S)”,
“B(P1)”, etc.
A BN is a triple ⟨V, E, Pr⟩ of a finite set V = {V1, . . . ,Vn} of variables,
each taking finitely many possible values; a set of edges E over the variables in
V, such that variables and edges ⟨V, E⟩ form a directed acyclic graph (DAG);
and a probability distribution Pr, such that the probability of each variable Vi
in the DAG obeys the Markov Condition (MC):
(MC) For any Vi ∈V = {V1, . . . ,Vn}, Vi⊥Noni ∣ Pari ,
where Pari denotes the set of parents of Vi, and Noni denotes the set of non-
descendants of Vi.3 In words, each variable is probabilistically independent of
its non-descendants, conditional on its parents. For instance, MC applied to the
DAG in Figure 1 implies that V4 ⊥ V1,V5 ∣V2,V3. In BN jargon, V2 and V3
screen off V4 from V1 and V5.
If a BN is causally interpreted, the edges stand for direct causal relations,
Pari denotes the set of direct causes of Vi, Noni the set of Vi’s non-effects
in the true causal structure regulating the behaviour of the variables in V, and
MC is called Causal Markov Condition (CMC) (cf. Spirtes et al. 2000, §3.4.1,
§3.5.1).
In addition, the Causal Faithfulness Condition (CFC) is often assumed in
the causal BN literature (Zhang and Spirtes 2008, 247):
3The “parents” of Vi are the direct ancestors of Vi, namely those variables on directed paths
into Vi from which Vi can be reached without mediation via other variables. The “descendants”
of Vi are those variables, including Vi, which may be reached from Vi along a directed path.
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Figure 1: A Bayesian network
(CFC) ⟨V, E, Pr⟩ is such that every conditional independence relation true in
Pr is entailed by CMC applied to the true DAG ⟨V, E⟩.
CFC guarantees that there is no causal dependence without probabilistic
dependence—i.e., the only probabilistic independencies in the graph are due
to the absence of causal dependencies. For instance, CFC applied to the BN in
Figure 1 implies V4 /⊥ V2, that is, there is no exact cancellation of V2’s effect
on V4 due to, say, a positive influence along the direct path V2 Ð→ V4 and a
negative influence along the indirect path V2 Ð→ V3 Ð→ V4. In particular, CFC
entails that all causal dependencies are detectable by conditional independence
tests, as commonly performed by BN constraint-based algorithms for causal
discovery (see, e.g., Spirtes et al. 2000, 82, 88, 144, and Pearl 2000, 50, 52).
A wide array of algorithms (e.g., SGS, PC, FCI, IC) are used under the
assumptions of CMC and CFC, as CMC and CFC are sufficient for the cor-
rectness of these algorithms. In many well-known contexts, CMC and CFC are
provably satisfied or only rarely violated, such that these assumptions are justi-
fied, to the effect that algorithms assuming CMC and CFC are reliable in those
contexts.
On the one hand, CMC is provably satisfied if (i) the functional relations in
the data-generating structure are linear, (ii) the exogenous variables and error
terms are independently distributed, (iii) all non-deterministic dependencies in
the data (i.e. dependencies not producing conditional probabilities equal to 1)
are due to noise and not to some fundamentally indeterministic process, that
is, all non-deterministic dependencies are so-called pseudoindeterministic, and
(iv) the variable set is causally sufficient, where (causal) Sufficiency is defined
as follows (Zhang 2006, 8; cf. Spirtes et al. 2000, §3.2.2):
(Sufficiency) ⟨V, E, Pr⟩ is such that every direct common cause of any two
variables in V either is in V or has an ancestor in V or has the same
value for all units in the population.
Sufficiency guarantees that for any two variables in V, there is no probabilistic
dependence not due to a causal dependence—i.e., no probabilistic dependence
is spurious.
On the other hand, CFC holds if (i) and (ii) hold, and (v) the data do not con-
tain deterministic but only pseudoindeterministic dependencies. In that case,
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violations of CFC have Lebesgue measure 0, which entails that they are very
rare (Spirtes et al., 2000, §3.5).
At the same time, there are well-known contexts in which BN assumptions
are frequently violated and, hence, not justified. One such context that will
be particularly relevant for the remainder of this paper consists in the presence
of deterministic dependencies (which generate conditional probabilities equal
to 1) in the data. Given determinism, violations of CFC are commonplace
(Spirtes et al. 2000, §3.8; Glymour 2007, 236). To illustrate, assume that the
dependencies along the path V1 Ð→ V2 Ð→ V4 in the causal structure of Figure
1 are deterministic, meaning that V1 determines V2, which determines V4. It
then holds that Pr(V4 ∣V1 ∧ V2) = Pr(V4 ∣V1) = 1, viz. that the indirect causeV1 screens off V4 from its direct cause V2, which, however, is not entailed
by CMC and hence violates CFC. That CFC violation does not hinge on the
particularities of the BN in Figure 1 but generalizes: all (and not just some
peculiar and rare) deterministic chains violate CFC. In light of the frequency
of CFC violations under determinism, standard BN algorithms are normally
assumed to be inapplicable to deterministic data.
3 THE LIMITS OF GEBHARTER’S PROPOSAL
3.1 The proposal
While BNs have a long tradition of successful applications in causal discovery,
they have played no role so far in constitutive discovery. The main reason is
that constitution is commonly assumed to be characterized by (non-reductive)
supervenience (see, e.g., Glennan 1996, 61-2, and Eronen 2011, ch. 11), which
generates deterministic dependencies: a complete set of constituents of a phe-
nomenon amounts to a supervenience base of that phenomenon, and thus a suf-
ficient condition for it—i.e., necessarily, there is no change in the phenomenon
without a change in its supervenience base. By contrast, as indicated in the
previous section, standard BN algorithms are typically only applied to indeter-
ministic data, which, moreover, are assumed to be pseudoindeterministic.
To further clarify the difference between pseudoindeterministic and deter-
ministic dependencies, consider the mechanism operating in an amplifier. LetG represent the phenomenon of gain, or total voltage increase, of an amplifier
subject to a voltage input I. Amplifiers are built by assembling a number of
active elements, usually transistors, in a circuit. We assume that the amplifier
in question is a two-stage amplifier, such that the signal received by a first tran-
sistor is amplified and fed to a second transistor, which further amplifies it. LetA and B be the transistors’ individual gains. Then, the amplifier’s overall gain
in response to any given input I = i is some pseudoindeterministic functionG = rGi − i + G , where rG indicates the amplifiers amplification ratio and G
is a noise term. For instance, if I = 2 volts and the amplification ratio is 8, then
the overall gain is G = 2 × 8 − 2 + G volts, where 14 (i.e., 2 × 8 − 2) volts and
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G volts, respectively, are G’s deterministic and non-deterministic components.
Analogously, the transistors’ gains are given by A = rAi − i + A volts andB = rBi − i + B volts. The amplification ratio of a serial amplifier is—ideally,
i.e., ignoring the role of the amplifier’s passive components—the product of its
transistors’ amplification ratios. Assume that the first transistor amplifies by
a ratio 2, and the second amplifies by a ratio 4, such that the amplifier’s ratio
is 8. Then, when subject to an input I = 2 volts, the first transistor amplifies
the signal by a gain of 2 × 2 − 2 + A volts; and the second transistor receives
that signal and amplifies it further by a gain of 4 × (4 + A) − (4 + A) + B
volts. By contrast, the relation between overall gain G on the one hand, and the
transistors’ individual gains A and B on the other hand, is not pseudoindeter-
ministic but deterministic: G is simply the sum ofA and B, meaning thatA andB determine G, such that whatever noisy component is present in G, it is inher-
ited from, and fully accounted for by, the noise in A and B. More precisely,
supervenience entails that rGi − i + G = rB(rAi + A) − i + B. When I = 2
volts, 2 × 8 − 2 + G = 4 × (4 + A) − 2 + B, that is, G = 4A + B.
Notwithstanding the frequency of CFC violations under determinism, Geb-
harter (2017b, 2652–54) has—surprisingly—argued that constitution satisfies
the same properties that the BN framework assumes for causation. More specif-
ically, he contends that the screening-off behaviour of complete sets of con-
stituents (i.e. sets comprising a complete supervenience base of a phenomenon)
is analogous to that of deterministic direct causes and that the screening-off be-
haviour of incomplete sets is analogous to that of indeterministic direct causes.
From that, he infers that constitutive relations can be represented by BNs and
that, with some restrictions, BN algorithms can be directly applied to variable
sets featuring both constitutive and causal relations, such that the uncovered
dependencies can then be grouped into causal and constitutive dependencies
using information about spatiotemporal overlap (i.e. about parthood relations).
In short, Gebharter claims that BN algorithms—in particular, PC —can be used
to perform causal and constitutive search in one go.
Given the well-known problems determinism creates for BN algorithms,
the natural conclusion to draw from Gebharter’s finding that constitution be-
haves like deterministic direct causation would be that BNs are not capable of
representing systems featuring constitutive relations and that—a fortiori—BN
algorithms are not applicable to systems featuring constitutive relations. Geb-
harter is aware that his proposal raises severe questions. He discusses two con-
ceivable approaches to reconcile the deterministic nature of constitution with
BN assumptions (cf. Gebharter 2017b, 2661–62):
(A) Only apply BN algorithms to incomplete constitutive sets, which do not
amount to complete supervenience bases and, hence, do not generate de-
terministic dependencies in the first place;
(B) Allow for deterministic dependencies but only apply BN algorithms to
systems featuring no more than two mechanistic levels.
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Approach (A) amounts to testing for deterministic dependencies prior to
a BN analysis (by, e.g., performing a multicollinearity test) and, if that test is
positive, abstain from applying BN algorithms. A variable setV featuring con-
stitutive relations will only be free of deterministic dependencies provided that
no phenomenon in V has a complete set of constituents in V. As constitution,
according to Gebharter, technically behave like causation, missing constituents
are on a par with missing causes of the phenomenon. Since constituents typ-
ically are not only relevant for the phenomenon but also for other micro-level
variables contained inV, it follows that missing constituents amount to missing
common causes of variables in V, in violation of causal Sufficiency (Gebhar-
ter, 2017b, 2660). Yet, if Sufficiency is violated, CMC tends to be violated as
well. Since adopting approach (A) in an attempt to avoid CFC violations gener-
ates frequent violations of CMC, Gebharter concludes that it fails to reconcile
the deterministic nature of constitution with BN assumptions. To justifiably
assume CMC, V should contain complete constitutive sets, meaning that data
over V should feature deterministic dependencies.
This leaves us with approach (B), which Gebharter indeed advances as a
solution to the problems prompted by the deterministic nature of constitution
(Gebharter, 2017b, 2662). In the previous section, we have seen that chains of
at least three deterministically related variables are a paradigmatic type of struc-
ture generating CFC violations. Without argument, Gebharter takes such chains
to be the source of all CFC violations induced by determinism. Accordingly, he
stipulates that BN algorithms only be applied to mechanistic systems with no
more than two levels, which excludes deterministic chains. More specifically,
Gebharter proposes to use background knowledge on spatiotemporal parthood
relations between instances of analysed variables in order to only include parts
of the phenomenon in V but not parts of parts of the phenomenon. That is, V
must not contain any triple of variables ⟨V1,V2,V3⟩ such that V1 is a part of V2,
which is a part of V3.4 Gebharter believes that this two-level restriction ensures
that deterministic dependencies do not conflict with CFC more frequently than
pseudoindeterministic dependencies and, hence, that CFC is justifiably assum-
able even for the purpose of constitutive discovery.
3.2 Extensive Faithfulness violations
Gebarther severely underestimates the problems constitutive relations induce
for BN algorithms. First, recall that, in order to justifiably assume CMC (and
Sufficiency), every analysed variable set V should contain a complete set of
constituents C for every phenomenon in V. Subject to the (presupposed) su-
pervenience of phenomena on their constituents, every phenomenon is deter-
4In the interest of brevity, we speak deliberately loosely—here and in the remainder of the
paper—about variables being related by spatiotemporal parthood. Of course, it is not the vari-
ables themselves that are related by spatiotemporal parthood but the entities represented by these
variables.
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Figure 2: (a) Structure of a two-stage amplifier mechanism over G = {I,G,S,A,B},
for an epiphenomenalist*. Dotted arrows are constitutive; all other arrows are causal.
(b) Graph over G where all edges that can be screened off have been eliminated.
mined by C. This bottom-up determination yields that every phenomenon is
screened off from all other variables—whether in V or not. The reason is that
determination is monotonic: if C determines V1, then C ∧ Vi also determinesV1, where Vi is an arbitrary variable. If Pr(V1∣C) = 1, then Pr(V1∣C ∧ Vi) = 1,
meaning that C screens off V1 from any variable Vi. Accordingly, in CMC-
warranting contexts, every mechanistic system (involving two or more levels)
will feature probabilistic independencies between phenomena and all their non-
constituents. Likewise assuming CFC in such contexts would imply that these
independencies are entailed by the true graphs, meaning that all macro phe-
nomena are both uncaused and causally inert, that is, causally isolated.
However, as most mechanists—the addressees of Gebharter’s proposal—
endorse the existence of macro-level causation,5 they will reject the inference to
the causal isolation of all phenomena by not assuming CFC in CMC-warranting
contexts. Instead, they will interpret the independencies between phenomena
and all non-constituents as yet another CFC violation induced by determin-
ism. Clearly, this breach of CFC obtains even in two-level systems. To il-
lustrate, reconsider our amplifier example and let the analysed variable set be
G = {I,G,S,A,B}, where I (the amplifier’s input), G (the amplifier’s over-
all gain), A (the first transistor’s gain), and B (the second transistor’s gain) are
complemented by S, which denotes, say, the distortion of the signal as received
by a loudspeaker. Since A and B determine G (from the bottom up), A and B
screen G off from I and S , or formally I,S ⊥ G ∣A,B. But if input and dis-
tortion are a cause and an effect of an amplifier’s gain in the true graph, these
conditional independencies violate CFC.
Such bottom-up determination can be reconciled with CFC by rejecting
that input and distortion actually are a cause and an effect of an amplifier’s
gain; more generally, by rejecting the possibility of macro-level causation, that
is, by committing to the metaphysical view that phenomena really are causally
isolated. That amounts to a radical form of macro-level epiphenomenalism,
call it epiphenomenalism*, viz. the view that non-fundamental properties are
5In fact, we are not aware of a single proponent of the mechanistic framework who would
endorse the causal isolation of macro phenomena.
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not only causally inert (as entailed by standard epiphenomenalism) but also
uncaused. More concretely, according to epiphenomenalism*, the true graph
for our amplifier example is the one in Figure 2a. Against that background, the
fact that G is screened off from I and S byA and B follows from CMC applied
to the true graph and, hence, does not violate CFC.
To uphold his claim that two-level systems do not violate CFC, Gebhar-
ter indeed endorses epiphenomenalism* (cf. Gebharter, 2017a). While this
manoeuvre reconciles bottom-up determination with CFC, it clashes with the
metaphysical commitments of most mechanists. Despite a longstanding debate
among philosophers on whether the notion of causation is dispensable in fun-
damental physics (Russell, 1913; Norton, 2003; Frisch, 2012), it is uncontro-
versial that macro-level disciplines, such as the social and biomedical sciences,
routinely engage in investigating causal relations among macro variables and,
hence, do not commit to epiphenomenalism*. A characterization of constitu-
tion that is at odds with the scientific practice of many non-fundamental disci-
plines is, at best, undesirable. This holds all the more in view of the fact that
dependencies between macro variables pass the usual BN tests for causation in
variable sets without variables in parthood and supervenience relations—tests
the validity of which Gebharter does not dispute.
What is worse, allowing deterministic dependencies in data processed
by common BN algorithms generates further problems, which—contrary to
epiphenomenalism*—Gebharter cannot possibly accept. In particular, in ad-
dition to bottom-up determination mechanistic systems with exactly two levels
may also feature top-down determination, to the effect that not only phenom-
ena are screened off from all incoming and outgoing influences, but also con-
stituents can be screened off in this way. This problem is best introduced by
reconsidering the amplifier example. The amplifier’s absolute overall gain G
is the sum of its constituents A and B. The function of addition, however, is
reversible: it not only holds that G is determined by A and B, but also that A is
determined by G and B (e.g., G = 14 ∧ B = 12 determines A = 2) and that B is
determined by G and A (e.g., G =14 ∧ A=2 determines B=12). Hence, every
variable in the set M = {G,A,B} is screened off from I and S by the other
two elements of M. To illustrate, all adjacencies corresponding to these con-
ditional independencies are removed from the graph skeleton in Figure 2b. A
causal/constitutive interpretation of that graph entails that the mechanism over
M is causally isolated from its environment.
This shows that, even if we grant Gebharter his epiphenomenalism*, our
amplifier still violates CFC. Subject to epiphenomenalism*, the true graph over
G is the one in Figure 2a. Hence, the top-down determination induced by
the reversible functional dependencies among the elements of M generates ad-
ditional conditional independencies not entailed by CMC applied to the true
graph. These additional independencies violate CFC. That is, in mechanistic
systems featuring no more than two levels, CFC may be violated even against
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the backdrop of epiphenomenalism*. To avoid this consequence, Gebharter
would have to endorse the absence of causal influences not only in and out ofG but also in and out of A and B. That is, he would have to contend that the
mechanisms responsible for the gains of amplifiers are causally isolated from
the rest of the universe. We take it as a given that Gebharter is not prepared to
go that far.
The crucial follow-up question now becomes how widespread top-down de-
termination is in mechanistic systems. It is clearly not limited to amplifier gains
or even to phenomena whose values are the sum of their constituents. Top-down
determination obtains whenever the relation between phenomena and their con-
stituents is regulated by an aggregation function with the following reversibility
property: a function y = f(x1, . . . , xn) is reversible iff all of its inputs xi are de-
termined by its output y in conjunction with all of its other inputs apart from xi,
or formally, iff for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi = f−1(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn, y). Ex-
amples of functions for which reversibility holds are linear functions, the prod-
uct of non-zero values, exponentiation of positive integers, the sum of squares,
many Boolean functions, or functions used in information coding, storage, and
encryption (which are explicitly exploited for their reversibility).
To provide another example, consider the phenomenon of voting by a show
of hands. Casting a vote, W = 1, can be constituted by a raise of either the
left hand, L= 1, or of the right hand, R= 1 (but raising both hands is invalid);
or formally, W = 1 ↔ (L = 1 ∧ R = 0) ∨ (L = 0 ∧ R = 1). This system of
binary variables does not only feature bottom-up determination but also top-
down determination: any of the four possible value configurations of {W,L}
and of {W,R} determine the value ofR and L, respectively.6 Hence, not only
the phenomenon of voting but also the hand raisings are screened off from all
variables outside of that system. But clearly, outside variables can de facto
causally interact with hand raisings (e.g. they have causes in the motor cortex
and effects in air displacement), which, in turn, entails that these conditional
independencies violate CFC.
These considerations suffice to establish that, contrary to what Gebharter
envisages in approach (B), CFC violations in (deterministic) mechanistic sys-
tems comprising only two levels are not rare but widespread—unlike CFC vi-
olations in (pseudoindeterministic) causal systems. A possible response to this
objection might be to further restrict the applicability of BN methods in con-
stitutive inference. More concretely, Gebharter could impose that his proce-
dure is only applicable to two-level systems satisfying the additional constraint
that the behaviours of the phenomenon and its constituents are regulated by
a non-reversible aggregation function. Paradigmatic non-reversible functions
are, for instance, periodic functions, products of zero, or the maximum and
minimum functions. If a phenomenon is aggregated from its constituents by a
6To illustrate for {W,L} and R: W = 0 ∧ R = 0 → L = 1; W = 0 ∧ R = 1 → L = 0;W =1 ∧ R=0→ L=1; and W =1 ∧ R=1→ L=0.
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non-reversible function, it does not hold for every constituent that its values are
determined by the phenomenon in conjunction with all other constituents, that
is, top-down determination does not obtain.
However, restricting the applicability of Gebharter’s procedure to systems
regulated by certain types of aggregation functions differs in a crucial respect
from Gebharter’s original approach (B), which only restricts it to two-level sys-
tems. A necessary condition for two variables V1 and V2 to be located at differ-
ent mechanistic levels is that either V1 is a spatiotemporal part of V2 or that V2
is a spatiotemporal part of V1. Hence, a variable set V can be said to contain
variables of no more than two mechanistic levels if it does not contain a triple⟨Vi,Vj ,Vk⟩ such that Vi is a part of Vj and Vj is a part of Vk. While identifying
spatiotemporal parthood relations—clarity on which is generally assumed in
the mechanistic literature—is undoubtedly difficult, it does not presuppose clar-
ity on constitutive relations. In consequence, that V satisfies the two-level re-
striction can be established independently of clarity on the constitutive relations
among the elements ofV. The same does not hold for a restriction to admissible
aggregation functions. It is unclear how it could be established independently
of clarity on the constitutive relations that a phenomenon is aggregated from
its constituents in V by a certain type of (non-reversible) function. What type
of function regulates the interplay between phenomena and constituents can
only be determined after the constituents have been identified. Identifying the
constituents, however, is exactly the purpose of Gebharter’s procedure. Hence,
avoiding CFC violations resulting from top-down determination by restricting
the applicability of the procedure to systems with certain types of aggregation
functions would render the procedure circular. Justifying the assumptions of
the procedure and, thus, justifiably applying it seems to presuppose clarity on
the very matter the procedure is designed to provide clarity for.
Nonetheless, let us assume for the sake of argument that there are types of
mechanistic systems for which the nature of the aggregation function is known
even in the absence of clarity on the constituents. Hence, the applicability of
Gebharter’s proposal could be confined to mechanisms known to have a non-
reversible aggregation function. Yet, not even such a restriction would ensure
compliance with CFC. To show this, we modify the voting example such that a
vote also counts as validly cast (W =1) if both hands are raised (L=1 ∧ R=1).
The function regulating the relation between the phenomenon W and its con-
stituents L and R shall hence be one of inclusive disjunction (i.e. maximum):W = 1 ↔ L= 1 ∨R= 1 (i.e. W = max(L,R)). While we still get bottom-up
determination from this system, we no longer get top-down determination. Not
every value configuration of {W,R} and {W,L} determines a value of L andR, respectively. For example, if W =1 and L=1, it is not determined whetherR takes the value 0 or 1, as both values are possible.
In order to decide whether Gebharter’s procedure is reliably applicable to
structures for which top-down determination can be non-circularly excluded,
D
R
A
FT
12 LORENZO CASINI AND MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER

M 
W 
D

L -
R
@
@R  
  K
HHHHHHj

*
(a)

M 
W 
D

L 
R AA
@
@
HHHHHH
(b)
Figure 3: Voting with non-reversible aggregation function. Under epiphenomenal-
ism*, (a) is the true graph (where dotted arrows are constitutive). In the skeleton graph
(b), all edges that can be screened off in O have been eliminated.
we embed this non-reversible voting mechanism in a simple causal context.
Let M be a variable representing the cause of hand raising in the voter’s mo-
tor cortex, and let D represent the ultimate decision being taken by the vote.
Let us moreover grant Gebharter that epiphenomenalism* is true. Against that
background, the true structure over the variable set O = {M,L,R,W,D} is
given in the graph of Figure 3a. Contrary to constitutive arrows, causal arrows
shall again be pseudoindeterministic, viz. error-disturbed, meaning that the mo-
tor cortex does not perfectly control the hand raisings, which, in turn, are not
perfectly reflected in the resulting decision (e.g. due to miscounting). In that
system, L and R cannot be screened off from their cause M by the other vari-
ables in O. However, since W is a deterministic function of L and R, andD can be expressed as a probabilistic function of W , W contains all the rel-
evant information for D. All that matters for the decision is whether at least
one hand was raised; whether it was the left or the right is irrelevant. Hence,
given the value ofW additional information about L orR has no bearing on the
probability of D. Or formally, D ⊥ L,R ∣W . That is, even without top-down
determination, W screens off the hand raisings from the resulting decision, as
shown in Figure 3b, which features a skeleton graph from which all screened
off edges are eliminated. These additional independencies do not follow from
CMC applied to the true graph and, hence, violate CFC. Hence, not even if the
absence of top-down determination could somehow be non-circularly ensured
would the satisfaction of CFC be guaranteed. In sum, strengthening approach
(B) by adding a restriction to certain types of aggregation functions is not a
feasible option.
These findings confirm the received wisdom in the BN literature that vari-
able sets comprising phenomena and their constituents are simply beyond the
scope of warranted applicability of standard BN algorithms, such as PC, which
are guaranteed to work only with pseudoindeterministic data (cf. condition 3 in
Spirtes et al., 2000, 351).
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3.3 PCD won’t save the day
Still, one may wonder whether the principle behind Gebharter’s proposal could
be saved by implementing it with a non-standard BN algorithm that works
with deterministic data, too. There indeed exists a variant of PC especially
designed for variable sets featuring deterministic dependencies, viz. PCD (Gly-
mour, 2007). PCD aims to make causal discovery insensitive to CFC violations
induced by determinism. To this end, it operates like PC with one important ex-
ception. Unlike PC, PCD does not remove an adjacency between two variablesVi and Vj if these variables can only be rendered independent by conditional-
izing on a subset of variables (excluding Vi and Vj) that bring the probability
of Vi or Vj up to 1. That is, screen-off relations involving maximal conditional
probabilities of 1 are not taken to indicate the absence of causation. PCD only
removes an adjacency between Vi and Vj if these variables can be screened-
off with non-maximal conditional probabilities. If the adjacency can only be
screened off with maximal probability, PCD leaves it in the graph and marks it
as “uncertain” with a question mark (Glymour, 2007, 236).
The first thing to note about replacing PC by PCD in Gebharter’s proce-
dure is that discovery by PCD is much less informative than by PC. More con-
cretely, while PC exploits conditional independencies of 1 to infer to (causal)
irrelevance, PCD simply abstains from drawing any inference from determinis-
tic independencies. As a result, whereas PC interprets the fact that phenomena
and—in case of reversible aggregation functions—constituents are screened off
from all outside variables as evidence for the causal isolation of mechanistic
systems, PCD takes those screen-off relations to indicate that the causal embed-
ding of mechanistic systems is unclear. That means replacing PC by PCD in
Gebharter’s procedure would not amount to replacing an algorithm that falsely
embeds mechanistic systems in their causal environment by an algorithm that
correctly embeds them but by an algorithm that does not embed them at all.
PCD would hence fall short of achieving Gebharter’s objective to develop a BN
discovery procedure that correctly uncovers causal and constitutive relations in
one go.
What is worse, it is doubtful whether the assumptions required by PCD are
any more justifiable when analysing mechanistic systems than the assumptions
of PC—even though PCD’s assumptions are clearly weaker than PC’s. While
applying PC requires assuming that all conditional independencies in the data,
including those with probabilities 1, faithfully reflect the true graph, applying
PCD only requires assuming that the conditional independencies with proba-
bilities lower than 1 are faithful to the true graph. But the voting example with
non-reversible aggregation function (max) has shown that bottom-up determi-
nation may generate non-deterministic screen-off relations that do not follow
from applying CMC to the true graph. The same thing happens in our amplifier
example. Since the overall gain G is the sum of the individual gains A and B
of the amplifier’s two transistors, G encodes all the information on A and B
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relevant for the probability of distortion, S. More concretely, even though S is
not determined by any subset of G = {I,G,S,A,B}, it is screened off from A
and B by the conjunction of the input I and the overall gain G: if we know I
and G, additional information onA or B has no bearing on the probability of S,
or formally, S ⊥ A,B ∣I,G. These conditional independencies do not depend
on I and G raising the probability of S to 1 and, hence, should be faithful to
the true graph if PCD is applied to data on our amplifier. However, if we follow
Gebharter in assuming epiphenomenalism*, the true graph is the one in Figure
2a, meaning that the downstream causal work is done by A and B. According
to more mainstream views, both G and {A,B} count as causes of S. On both
views, it thus follows that these conditional independencies are unfaithful to the
true graph even by the faithfulness standards of PCD.
Clearly, these (non-deterministic) CFC violations do not hinge on the par-
ticularities of the voting or the amplifier example. If a set of variables D de-
termines a variable Vi, it easily happens that Vi encodes all the information on
D relevant to some downstream variable Vj . In all such cases, Vi renders Vj
conditionally independent of D, even if the corresponding conditional proba-
bilities are below 1. Without a doubt, this is a frequent pattern in systems fea-
turing complete constitutive sets of phenomena. According to all metaphysical
views that do not deny causal efficacy to constituents, these (non-deterministic)
conditional independencies violate the faithfulness standards of PCD and, thus,
render the use of that algorithm unwarranted.
3.4 False positives
Recently, there have been various studies (e.g. Zhang and Spirtes 2008, Zha-
lama et al. 2017) investigating to what degree violations of CFC affect the ac-
tual output of PC. These studies suggest, among other things, that proper parts
of PC outputs can, under certain circumstances, be reliably interpreted despite
CFC violations—that is, even if the rest of these outputs is unreliable. A pos-
sible response to our critique might thus be to adjust the interpretation of the
outputs of BN algorithms so as to avoid fallacies induced by CFC violations.
More concretely, according to the standard interpretation of outputs of BN al-
gorithms, the presence and absence of edges reflect the presence and absence
of causal relations in the true graph. As standard BN algorithms use screen-off
relations as evidence for the absence of causal relations, the fact that mechanis-
tic systems frequently generate screen-off relations unfaithful to the true graphs
undermines the standard interpretation of absent edges in terms of absent cau-
sation. On the face of it, however, present edges, which reflect probabilistic de-
pendencies that cannot be screened-off, remain unaffected by CFC violations.
So perhaps there is a case to be made that, when applied to mechanistic sys-
tems, PC can still be used to reliably infer to the presence of causal/constitutive
dependence relations without incurring false positives, even if it cannot be used
to reliably infer to the absence of such relations, due to a severe risk of false
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Figure 4: PC-friendly variant of the structure in Figure 2a over G∗ =G ∪ {X ,Z}
negatives. If this holds up to scrutiny, Gebharter’s approach could be used as a
means to uncover the presence of constitution and causation, even if it does not
reliably exhibit their absence.
To investigate that question we set up a battery of inverse search trials test-
ing the reliability of PC’s analysis of data simulated from the mechanistic struc-
ture behind our amplifier example. We conduct the trials in R using the PC im-
plementation pcalg by Kalisch et al. (2012). (A replication script is available in
the paper’s supplementary material.) The trials have two objectives: (i) to de-
termine the ratio of false positives both among unoriented and oriented edges
issued by PC when applied to data featuring deterministic dependencies, and
(ii) to determine the ratio among these false positives ascribable to the presence
of determinism.
The quality of the outputs of PC (or of any other constraint-based algo-
rithm) is known to be sensitive to various factors, for instance, to the existence
of unshielded colliders, the sample size, the joint normality of the distribution
or the linearity of the functional dependencies (see, e.g., Spirtes et al., 2000,
351). As deterministic dependencies induced by constitution shall be the only
obstacle for PC in our trials, we ensure that they are otherwise favourable to the
requirements of PC. To this end, we do not directly simulate data from the am-
plifier structure in Figure 2a but add two unshielded colliders, one onA and one
on S. More concretely, we simulate 1000 data sets with a (large) sample size
of 10’000 observations each on the (epiphenomenalist*) structure in Figure 4
over the variable setG∗ = {I,G,S,A,B,X ,Z}. We draw normally distributed
values for all variables and for all (mutually independent) error terms, all be-
ing centred around 0 and having randomly sampled standard deviations. All
variables are related by linear functions. To avoid that our results are sensitive
to any numeric elements of those linear functions, we randomly draw numeric
constants and multipliers (from the interval [−5,5]) for each of the 1000 simu-
lated data sets.
In total, we conduct two test series of the type described above, one for ob-
jective (i) and one for objective (ii). The only difference is that in the (i)-seriesG is aggregated from A and B deterministically, that is, without error terms,
while in the (ii)-series G is a pseudoindeterministic function of A and B with
an error term. All other variables, in both test series, are pseudoindeterministic.
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Figure 5: Completeness ratios, false positive ratios, and recovery rates of the A Ð→G ←Ð B collider produced by (epiphenomenalist*) structures over G∗ where the col-
lider is deterministic (left) and pseudoindeterministic (right).
We cull false positive ratios for both unoriented edges and orientations from
our tests. The false positive ratio in an individual trial is the number of unori-
ented/oriented edges contained in the output graph but not in the true graph of
Figure 4, divided by the total number of edges in the output graph. We addi-
tionally report the completeness ratios, i.e. the number of unoriented/oriented
edges contained both in the output graph and the true graph divided by the total
number of edges in the true graph, as well as the recovery rate for the constitu-
tive collider at G, which is the core search target of Gebharter’s approach. The
bar chart in Figure 5 presents the means of all of the above ratios over all 1000
trials in the (i)-series on the left-hand side and the (ii)-series on the right-hand
side.
Our findings show that there is a significant difference in false positive ra-
tios. Under determinism, 16.3% of the edges output by PC are false, on average,
and 21.5% of the orientations. Under pseudoindeterminism, those numbers go
down to 1.6% and 10.5%, respectively. That is, G being a deterministic func-
tion of its constituents increases the false positive ratio for edges by a factor
of 10 and for orientations by a factor of 2. Under the conditions favourable to
the performance of PC, viz. normality, linearity, pseudoindeterminism, PC per-
forms almost faultlessly when it comes to identifying (unoriented) edges and
satisfactorily when it comes to identifying orientations. The presence of only
one deterministic variable leads to 1 of 5 orientations being wrong, which is a
performance hardly describable as satisfactory (under otherwise ideal discov-
ery conditions). Importantly, the difference in false positive ratios in the two
test series is not imputable to the fact that altogether fewer edges would be re-
covered in the pseudoindeterministic case. In fact, whether G is a deterministic
or pseudoindeterministic function of A and B does not significantly affect the
completeness ratios. In the (i)-series, on average 77% of the edges of the true
graph are recovered and 56.5% of the true orientations. In the (ii)-series, those
ratios go up slightly to 78.4% and 58.2%, respectively. It is also remarkable
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that the recovery rate for the constitutive collider at G is the same under deter-
minism as the false positive ratio for orientations. Under pseudoindeterminism,
by contrast, the collider at G is recovered in 43.2% of the trials.
That determinism multiplies the false positive ratios of PC by 10 for edges
and by 2 for orientations in trials under these—apart from determinism—ideal
conditions for PC, clearly suggests a negative answer to the question whether
PC could be used to reliably infer to the presence of causal/constitutive depen-
dence relations in mechanistic systems. In our (paradigmatic) test structure, the
risk of committing a false positive is the same as the chance of being rewarded
by the discovery of a constitutive collider—meaning the risk is not worth tak-
ing. Gebharter could respond that a 1-in-5 false positive ratio must be tolerated
if one is to make any use of BN methods for constitutive discovery, which, after
all, are widely acknowledged tools for scientific modelling. In the next section,
we show that this is not so.
In sum, we take the arguments in this section to cast severe doubts on Geb-
harter’s proposed use of BN methods for constitutive discovery, and in particu-
lar, to show that treating constitution as a form of deterministic direct causation
is not a promising way of bringing Bayesian methods to bear on the task of
constitutive discovery. An alternative approach is required, which rejects the
basic assumption that constitution is formally analogous to causation, such that
BN causal discovery methods cannot be applied to variable sets including phe-
nomena and their constituents.
4 AN ALTERNATIVE
We cannot develop a full-blown theory of mechanistic constitution in the re-
mainder of this paper. Instead, we confine ourselves to establishing a basis for
bringing BN methods to bear on constitutive discovery in a way that avoids
the aforementioned problems. To this end, we devise a sufficient condition for
constitution, which, on the one hand, captures a pre-theoretic intuition many
associate with constitution and, on the other, can be exploited by standard BN
algorithms in a way that keeps false positive ratios low while still uncovering
constitution sufficiently frequently. To be clear about an important caveat from
the outset, our account—qua mere sufficient condition—will provide a handle
to infer to the presence of constitution but not to its absence.
Our starting point is the view, widespread in the philosophy of the special
sciences, that phenomena are causally identifiable (Fodor, 1974; Kim, 1999;
Fazekas and Kerte´sz, 2011; Soom, 2012). Here are two well-known examples
from Kim (1999). Being in pain is “being in some state (or instantiating some
property) caused by tissue damage and causing winces and groans” (13). Being
a gene is, roughly, “the property of having some property (or being a mecha-
nism) that performs a certain causal function, namely that of transmitting phe-
notypic characteristics from parents to offsprings” (10). Or, to come back to our
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Figure 6: Causal roles (a) of G over G ∖ {A,B} and (b) of A and B over G ∖ {G}.
guiding example, amplification is that behaviour caused by voltage input and
causing signal distortion. The causal identifiability of phenomena entails the
falsity of epiphenomenalism: some phenomena, viz. the causally identifiable
ones, have causes and effects.
The causal identification of a phenomenon, however, does not explain why
that phenomenon has its characteristic causes and effects in a particular system.
This is the job of a mechanistic explanation. By decomposing the phenomenon
into its parts and identifying its constituents, a mechanistic explanation ac-
counts for why the phenomenon has its characteristic causal role. Accordingly,
the need for a mechanistic explanation only arises for phenomena with a char-
acteristic causal role, that is, for phenomena with causes and effects. We do not
want to impose that all phenomena have characteristic causal roles and, thus,
can be causally identified. But clearly, if there are phenomena without causes
and effects, viz. causally isolated phenomena, they are uninteresting from the
mechanistic perspective, as they would be beyond the scope of mechanistic ex-
plainability. Overall we thus commit to a radically different metaphysical back-
ground from Gebharter’s. While he endorses epiphenomenalism*, we contend
that all mechanistically interesting phenomena have characteristic causes and
effects, which is a view much more in line with the mainstream convictions in
the mechanistic literature.
In a nutshell, the leading intuition underwriting our proposal is that, if a
part’s causal role (partially) accounts—in a sense to be qualified—for why the
phenomenon has its characteristic causal role, that part is a constituent. In
what follows, we make this intuition precise within the formalism of causal
BNs, where the notion of the causal role of a variable Vi can be straightfor-
wardly cashed out in terms of the set of directed edges in and out of Vi in the
true causal BN over a variable set complying with CMC and CFC and compris-
ing Vi.
Our results from the previous section show that the BN machinery can-
not be applied to variable sets comprising both phenomena and their parts. In
consequence, before variable sets over mechanistic systems can be processed
by BN methods, these variable sets must be partitioned into subsets free of
mereological relations and, thereby, free of constitutive relations.7 Contrary to
V, such constitution-free subsets (in the amplifier example, G ∖ {A,B} and
7Note that generating these mereology-free partitions presupposes (as is common in the lit-
erature on constitution) knowledge of parthood relations but not of constitutive relations.
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G ∖ {G}; see Figure 6) can safely be assumed to comply with CMC and CFC,
which makes them amenable to standard BN discovery methods.
Throughout our ensuing discussion we rely on the following formal con-
ventions. V1 denotes a (mechanistically interesting) phenomenon in a variable
set V; and P1 denotes the set of all and only the spatiotemporal parts of V1 in
V—meaning that for all Vi in P1, the spatiotemporal region occupied by an
instance of V1 contains the spatiotemporal regions occupied by the instances ofVi. For simplicity, we assume that no other variable besides V1 has parts inV—
which entails that P1 is free of mereological relations. Moreover, In1 ∪Out1
denotes the set of inputs and outputs identifying V1’s characteristic causal role,
by which we mean the causal relations between the elements of In1 ∪Out1
and V1, viz. the directed edges in and out of V1 in the true causal graph over
a variable set including In1 ∪Out1 and V1 but no variables in P1. Since ev-
ery mechanistically interesting phenomenon is causally identifiable, every such
phenomenon has at least one cause and one effect. It follows that In1 ≠∅ and
Out1 ≠ ∅. Finally, Anc(Vi) and Des(Vi) denotes the sets of, respectively,
ancestors and descendants of Vi. Then, in the true graph over V ∖P1, it holds
that In1 ⊆Anc(V1) and Out1 ⊆Des(V1).
The notion of a part of V1 accounting for the causal role of V1, which is
crucial for our leading intuition, can be spelled out in terms of that part being
an element of a set of parts Z that has the same causal role as V1 and, thus, can
be substituted for V1 in causal explanations. We shall say that Z has the same
causal role as V1 iff (i) all variables in In1 have at least one effect in Z, and
(ii) all variables in Out1 have at least one cause in Z, and (iii) there exists no
proper subset of Z satisfying (i) and (ii) (i.e. Z is minimal with respect to (i)
and (ii)). Z may comprise variables not contained in V and P1, respectively.
Yet, even if P1 itself does not comprise a subset sharing V1’s causal role, it
nonetheless holds that all variables in P1 located on a causal path from In1 to
Out1 are contained in some such minimal set Z (not necessarily the same one)
and, hence, account for the causal role of V1. It follows that all variables on
a directed path from In1 to Out1 (partially) account for the causal role of V1
and, thus, constitute V1. More precisely, relative to a given variable set V, V1’s
causal role with respect to In1 ∪Out1 in V ∖P1 is accounted for by the parts
of V1 on a directed path from In1 to Out1 in V ∖ {V1}. All of those parts are
constituents of V1 in V.
At the same time, we do not want to stipulate that all constituents account
for the causal role of their phenomena. A phenomenon may have constituents
that make a difference to it and yet are not contained in a minimal set shar-
ing all of the phenomenon’s causes and effects. For instance, a phenomenon
may have parts causing its characteristic effects without being caused by its
characteristic causes, viz. without being on a directed path from the latter to
the former.8 Or, our amplifier could feature parts of G causally influencing the
8We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
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gains at A and B without being on directed paths from I to S. As causes ofA and B, such parts would make a difference to G without accounting for G’s
causal role. Since we do not want to preclude the possibility that such parts are
considered constituents as well, we do not elevate being on a directed path from
a phenomenon’s characteristic causes to its characteristic effects to the status of
a necessary condition of constitution.9
Overall, the above considerations yield the following, causal-role (CR)
based, sufficient condition for constitution:
(CR) Let V1’s causal role be identified by In1 ∪ Out1, where In1 ≠ ∅ and
Out1 ≠ ∅. Let the (true) causal graph in V ∖ P1 be such that In1 ⊆
Anc(V1) and Out1 ⊆ Des(V1), where V1 is the only variable in V
with parts in V, and P1 is the set of spatiotemporal parts of V1 in V.
Then, Vi constitutes V1 if:
(i) Vi ∈ P1; and
(ii) in the (true) causal graph over V ∖ {V1}, Vi ∈ Des(In1) and Vi ∈
Anc(Out1).
Less formally, for a part Vi of a phenomenon V1—whose characteristic causal
role is identified by the causal structure over some set V ∖ P1—to constituteV1, it is sufficient that, in the causal structure over V∖{V1}, Vi is on a directed
path from In1 to Out1. For instance, A (resp. B) constitutes G, because there
exists a variable set G, which may be partitioned into two subsets G ∖ PG
and G∖{G} without mereological relations, such that the structures over those
subsets contain, respectively, a path I Ð→ G Ð→ S, and a path I Ð→ A Ð→ S
(resp. I Ð→ B Ð→ S).
Our account lends itself to a straightforward methodological implemen-
tation. Given an overall set of analysed variables V, the search target of a
Bayesian discovery procedure inspired by our proposal is a set C1 of con-
stituents contained in the set P1 ⊂ V of spatiotemporal parts of a target phe-
nomenon V1 ∈ V, which is causally identified by a set of characteristic causes
In1 ⊂ V and effects Out1 ⊂ V. According to CR, a variable Vi in P1 is con-
tained in C1 if Vi is located on a directed path from In1 to Out1 in V ∖ {V1}.
To find a suitable C1 along these lines, V must first be partitioned into two
distinct subsets free of mereological relations, to the effect that V1 and P1 are
assigned to different partitions. Both of these partitions will be free of constitu-
tive relations and, thus, of deterministic dependencies. It follows that they will
9Our proposal, thus, differs from so-called inbetweenness accounts of constitution, which are
less cautious in that regard. They advance the condition of being a part on directed paths between
the input and the output of the phenomenon as both sufficient and necessary for constitution
(Harinen 2018; Prychitko 2019; cf. Craver 2015, 22). Our proposal additionally differs from such
accounts insofar as the latter are formulated in terms of the notion of an intervention, whereas
our aim here—like Gebharter’s in his (2017b)—is to ground the inference to constitution from
pure observational evidence, i.e. without manipulation of the mechanism.
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Figure 7: Non-epiphenomenalist* variant of the structure in Figure 4.
both be amenable to a standard causal analysis by BN algorithms. Assuming
that V1 is a causally well-defined phenomenon, it follows that we know (e.g.
from previous studies) that V1 is caused by In1 and causes Out1. That is, a
causal analysis of the partition V ∖P1 can be used as a sort of quality bench-
mark for the processed data or study design. If the causal role of V1 is not
correctly recovered, that is, if the path In1 Ð→ V1 Ð→ Out1 is not recovered,
it can be inferred that there is a problem with the analysed data (e.g. too much
noise) or with the set V (e.g. suitable unshielded colliders are missing), such
that a causal search overV∖{V1} is unlikely to recover the causal roles of con-
stituents of V1, either. By contrast, if this quality benchmark turns out positive,
a causal analysis of the partition V ∖ {V1} is likely to identify elements of C1
insofar as it recovers directed causal paths from In1 throughP1 intoOut1. All
parts on such paths belong to C1.
By rejecting the basic assumption that constitution behaves like determin-
istic direct causation, CR provides a simple and elegant solution to the prob-
lems incurred by Gebharter’s procedure. Since CR is formulated in terms of
mereology-free partitions of the total variable set V, it is not affected by deter-
ministic dependencies in V generating frequent CFC violations. This, in turn,
allows for a suitable causal embedding of mechanisms both on the macro and
the micro level. Likewise, a BN implementation of CR is not subject to the
problem that deterministic dependencies significantly increase the false posi-
tive ratio of BN algorithms. CR-based inferences to constitution are subject to
the same false positive ratios as standard causal inferences of BN algorithms.
Moreover, while Gebharter’s procedure is only applicable if an analysed
variable set V features complete constituting sets, which behave like a com-
plete set of common causes and thus satisfy Sufficiency, CR may be correctly
implemented also when an incomplete set of constituents are in V. Provided a
phenomenon’s part belongs to a directed path from inputs to outputs, it counts
as a constituent by the lights of CR.
To demonstrate the performance of our approach when implemented with
the aid of PC, we conduct two series of inverse search trials by simulating data
from the non-epiphenomenalist* version of our amplifier structure in Figure 7,
which—like the structure in Figure 4—features two additional unshielded col-
liders to facilitate the orientation of edges. The trials are set up analogously
to the trials in §3.4. (A detailed replication script is again available in the
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Figure 8: Completeness ratios, false positive ratios, and recovery rates for the paths
the I Ð→ G Ð→ S, I Ð→ A Ð→ S, and I Ð→ B Ð→ S produced by the structures
over G∗ ∖ {A,B} (left) and over G∗ ∖ {G} (right).
paper’s supplementary material.) In each test series, we draw 1000 data sets
with 10’000 observations each; all variables in G∗ = {I,G,S,A,B,X ,Z} are
Gaussian; all variables in G∗ ∖ {G} are pseudoindeterministic with mutually
independent error terms; G is a deterministic function of A and B; all func-
tional dependencies are linear; all numeric elements of those linear functions
are randomly drawn.
The first test series is run on the partition of G∗ without the parts, viz.
on G∗ ∖ {A,B}, the second series on the partition without the phenomenon
G∗ ∖ {G}. In addition to completeness and false positive ratios for both edges
and orientations, we now cull the recovery rates for the directed paths from I
via G or A/B to S from our test results. The bar chart in Figure 8 presents the
means of all of these ratios over all 1000 trials in the series over G∗ ∖ {A,B}
on the left-hand side and the series over G∗ ∖ {G} on the right-hand side.
The first and most important finding is that in both test series the false
positive ratios are very low. In the partition G∗ ∖ {A,B}, PC produces 0.3%
false edges and 1.3% false orientations, on average, while these numbers go up
to 1.4% and 4.1%, respectively, in the partition G∗ ∖ {G}.10 Importantly, these
low false positive rates are not due to PC being overly cautious in drawing
inferences, as reflected by the high completeness ratios for edges (81.7% in
both G∗ ∖ {A,B} and G∗ ∖ {G}) and orientations (73.8% in G∗ ∖ {A,B},
67.3% in G∗ ∖ {G}).
A second finding concerns G∗ ∖ {G}, which, according to CR, is the parti-
tion of interest for constitutive discovery. The recovery rates for the causal paths
from I through A and B to S are 52.3% and 39.5%, respectively. While those
numbers are not impressive, they are significantly higher than the recovery rate
(21.6%) of the constitutively revealing structural feature, viz. the collider at G,
Gebharter’s procedure achieves in the test series in §3.4. The benchmark test
10Note that these results are not directly comparable with one another (or with the results in
the test series of §3.4) because the true graphs relative to different variable sets differ as well.
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in G∗ ∖ {A,B} shows that the recovery rate (58.4%) for the macro-level pathI Ð→ G Ð→ S is likewise not impressively high. This indicates that the dis-
covery conditions for PC are not ideal in our test design. We presume that
these recovery rates could be improved by, for instance, adding a further un-
shielded collider on B or another variable on the directed edge I Ð→ S, but
we do not further investigate these variations of our test design in the present
context. What matters for us here is to demonstrate the reliable applicability of
CR. Whenever a PC-based implementation of CR uncovers paths from inputs
of a phenomenon via its parts to its outputs, these paths can be interpreted in
terms of causation at a very low false positive risk, meaning that the parts can
be reliably interpreted as constituents in virtue of CR.
5 CONCLUSION
Alexander Gebharter has suggested that BN causal discovery tools may be fruit-
fully brought to bear on the problem of constitutive discovery. He proposes
that they be used to infer to causal as well as constitutive dependencies in one
go, despite the widespread view that causation and constitution are fundamen-
tally different. The first part of this paper argued that Gebharter’s proposal in-
curs severe problems. First, one background assumption of standard BN algo-
rithms, viz. CFC, is often violated in mechanistic contexts, meaning that these
algorithms—PC in particular—cannot be reliably applied. Second, the prob-
lem cannot be remedied by employing a non-standard BN algorithm, viz. PCD,
that is designed for contexts of CFC violations induced by determinism. The
reason is that PCD is much less informative and, what is worse, constitutive
dependencies tend to generate probabilistic independencies that are unfaithful
even by PCD’s weakened Faithfulness standards. Third, only interpreting the
presence (and not the absence) of edges in outputs of the PC algorithm pro-
duced in CFC-violating contexts does not amount to a promising weakening
of Gebharter’s proposal. We showed, in a series of inverse search trials, that
determinism induced by constitution prevents PC from reliably inferring to the
presence of causal/constitutive dependencies. From all this, we concluded that
Gebharter’s starting point, viz. treating constitution as a form of deterministic
direct causation, and directly applying BN discovery methods to mixed sets of
causal and constitutive dependencies, is not a promising way of bringing BN
methods to bear on the task of constitutive discovery.
As an alternative, the second part of the paper proposed to exploit the intu-
ition that, in a mechanistic explanation, the causal role of a target phenomenon
is explained by the more fundamental causal roles of some of the system’s parts.
We cashed this general intuition out in the framework of BNs. More precisely,
we offered a sufficient condition for constitution: if the behaviour of a part of
a phenomenon is located on a directed path from the phenomenon’s character-
istic causes to its characteristic effects, that part is a constituent. We showed
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that this condition can be tested by means of PC in a way that does not require
assuming CFC (or any of the other BN assumptions for causation) to hold of
variable sets including both phenomena and their parts. Our proposal avoids the
problems of Gebharter’s proposal in a simple and elegant way and, as a result,
provides a theoretically sound foundation for the application of BN methods to
constitutive discovery.
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